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Technology-based ventures provide an important route for successful technology transfer [1], [2]. Their founders are supported in successful technology commercialization by innovation intermediaries [3]. Accordingly, the performance of an innovation system, at least to some extent, depends on the efficiency of these intermediaries in terms of the impact of their scarce resources on the survival and growth of technology-based ventures. To increase their efficiency, intermediaries typically optimize their "intake" by requesting a formal business plan to base their selection on as a hygiene factor [4]-[7]. Thus, some scholars argue that written business plans show significant distortion as being produced only to attract support from innovation intermediaries [6], [8]. Accordingly, they rarely serve for these addressees as a source of information for analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of ventures, in order to derive actionable conclusions and more effectively support ventures [9], [10]. Addressees search for different indicators in business plans for their evaluation [11]. The descriptions of these indicators only evince little empirical proof for the performance of technology-based venture's [8], [12]. This gap is herein addressed, in contrast to the lacking empirical insight, as the most frequently produced artifact of early-stage technology ventures is at the same time a written business plan [10], [13]. This paper addresses this gap by conceptualizing transaction relations described in the written business plan as a means for working around the inevitable inaccuracies and uncertainties that delimit the explanatory abilities [14] of the snapshot model [10] presented by a business plan. Using a qualitative content analysis, we derive from the descriptions of transaction relations in a written business plan valid indicators for the maturity of the venture's value-network in different dimensions [15]. To this extent, this paper presents the findings from a pre-study that was conducted based on a sample of forty business plans from an overall population of 800 business plans in a longitudinal sample from one of Europe's most active innovation systems, the regional State of Baden-Württemberg. Such findings may be used by innovation intermediaries to enhance their efficiency, by enabling these to not only derive individual support strategies for business acceleration but also to analyze the impact of support measures by reliably monitoring maturity progress in venture activities.
Technology commercialization is described as the most dreadful challenge for technology-based entrepreneurs. The scarcity of resources and limited managerial experience make it a daunting task, putting in danger the whole firm emergence. Prior research has often build upon the resource-based view to propose that the new firms' performance is dependent on their initial resource endowments and configurations. Nevertheless, little is known on how the early-stage decisions of the entrepreneur might influence on the growth of the firm. Scholars have suggested that both technology and market orientation actions could influence the performance and growth of firms in this context; nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence of the influence of these different orientations in the context of new technology-based firms (NTBFs). In this study we propose to explore the influence of technology and demand creation actions adopting a demand-side view. We use a longitudinal study on a panel dataset (2004-2007) with 249 U.S. new high-technology firms to test our hypothesis. The results point towards a rather limited influence of initial resource configurations, as well as an unexpected influence of market and technology orientation in the growth dimensions of an NTBF. The research holds implications for the management of new technology-based firms and for those interested in supporting the development of technology entrepreneurship.
Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE) has now evolved into an imperative innovation practice of established companies. Despite organizational design models for CE activities and companies' frequent initiation of new activities, effectively managing them remains a challenging endeavor which results in disappointment about the outcomes of CE and its early termination. We assume specific types of goals for CE as one element of this unresolved management issue. While both practice and literature address goals in different contexts, no uniform picture has emerged so far. Although goals are commonly used to categorize CE activities, they seldomly seem to be the core subject of investigation. Based on this preliminary analysis and consolidation, we put the goals of CE in focus. In a systematic literature review, we reveal aspects of goals to unmask the different types of goals and their underlying dimensions and characteristics. Our review contributes to a better understanding of goals by (1) organizing relevant literature on goals of CE in a specific classification process, (2) describing dimensions and attributes for a systematic classification of CE goals; and (3) providing a framework showing differences of goals for the CE context. We conclude with a discussion and hints for future research paths.
Nowadays established companies use Corporate Entrepreneurship (CE) as a means to create discontinuous innovations. Many companies thereby even implement multiple CE units that typically involve several entrepreneurial activities. This explorative study aimed to identify the reasons why established companies implement multiple CE units concurrently. In conducting a comparative case study with eight companies from different industries, valuable insights for science and practice were gained. We provide an overview of different 11 reasons for implementing multiple CE units. This shows that the combination of CE units used by companies differs depending on the reason. It further allowed to derive general approaches of established companies to the implementation of CE units. Last, we identify the concept of co-specialization to be a central driver explaining the creation of the need to set up multiple units. We conclude by indicating implications and subjects for future research.
