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This paper introduces the third update/release of the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB-R3). The GSDB-R3 extends the period of coverage from 1950–2019 to 1950–2022, which includes two special periods—COVID-19 and the new sanctions against Russia. This update of the GSDB contains a total of 1325 cases. In response to multiple inquiries and requests, the GSDB-R3 has been amended with a new variable that distinguishes between unilateral and multilateral sanctions. As before, the GSDB comes in two versions, case-specific and dyadic, which are freely available upon request at GSDB@drexel.edu. To highlight one of the new features of the GSDB, we estimate the heterogeneous effects of unilateral and multilateral sanctions on trade. We also obtain estimates of the effects on trade of the 2014 sanctions on Russia.
We quantify the effects of GATT/WTO membership on trade and welfare. Using an extensive database covering manufacturing trade for 186 countries over the period 1980–2016, we find that the average partial equilibrium impact of GATT/WTO membership on trade among member countries is large, positive, and significant. We contribute to the literature by estimating country-specific estimates and find them to vary widely across the countries in our sample with poorer members benefitting more. Using these estimates, we simulate the general equilibrium effects of GATT/WTO on welfare, which are sizable and heterogeneous across members. We show that countries not experiencing positive trade effects from joining GATT/WTO can still gain in terms of welfare, due to lower import prices and higher export demand.
While managerial mobility is ubiquitously seen as an integral part of the success in firms’ internationalization, discerning its empirical merits has been impaired by the paucity of quasi-experimental evidence, or adequate instrumental variables. To overcome these objective limitations, this paper proposes a novel identification strategy, which uses a control function based on on-the-job search theory to correct estimates for the presence of self-selected mobility flows. Our analysis confirms the finding that managers’ specific market experience matters for firms’ internationalization, especially when it derives from longer tenures at the former jobs.
Regarding the attributes of managerial knowledge, our results reveal that on-the-job earned experience is at least as effective for firms’ internationalization as in born knowledge (i.e. origins) and that managers’ personal network of customers is an important asset in managers’ fund of expertise for the expansion into new markets.
Im Sommersemester 2022 habe ich laufende und neue Forschungsprojekte sowohl national wie auch international vorangetrieben. Schwerpunktmäßig wurde die international etablierte Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB) in Kooperation mit Forschern aus den USA und Österreich aktualisiert und in Form einer Forschungsarbeit der Forschungsgemeinschaft bekannt gemacht. Aufgrund der erarbeiteten Expertise habe ich zahlreiche Vorträge und Interviews in Medien zu Sanktionen und deren ökonomische Wirkung gegeben. Darüber hinaus wurde ein Buchkapitel zu Sanktionen in Kooperation mit internationalen Wissenschaftlern verfasst. Ferner wurde ein neues Forschungsprojekt in Kooperation mit einem regionalen Unternehmen zur Entwicklung eines Prozesses für die THG-Bilanzierung initiiert. Zwei wissenschaftliche Publikationen (peer-reviewed) wurden finalisiert. Ferner wurden 2 neue wissenschaftliche Forschungsprojekte mit internationalen Wissenschaftlern initiiert und die Ergebnisse in Arbeitspapieren veröffentlicht. Die zugrundeliegenden Manuskripte wurden in peer-reviewed Zeitschriften eingereicht. In Kooperation mit der Universität Konstanz wurde ein Schülertag für Gymnasiasten organisiert, um die Bedeutung von Wirtschaftspolitik den Schülern näher zu bringen.
Many countries offer state credit guarantees to support credit-constrained exporters. The policy instrument is commonly justified by governments as a means to mitigating adverse outcomes of financial market frictions for exporting firms. Accumulated returns to the German state credit guarantee scheme deriving from risk-compensating premia have outweighed accumulated losses over the past 60 years. Why do private financial agents not step in and provide insurance given that the state-run program yields positive returns? We argue that costs of risk diversification, liquidity management, and coordination among creditors limit the ability of private financial agents to offer comparable insurance products. Moreover, we suggest that the government’s greater effectiveness in recovering claims in foreign countries endows the state with a cost advantage in dealing with the risks involved in large export projects. We test these hypotheses using monthly firm-level data combined with official transaction-level data on covered exports of German firms and find suggestive evidence that positive effects on trade are due to mitigated financial constraints: State credit guarantees benefit firms that are dependent on external finance, if the value at risk which they seek to cover is large, and at times when refinancing conditions on the private financial market are tight.
The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB): an update that includes the years of the Trump presidency
(2021)
This paper examines how varying antidumping methodologies applied within the World Trade Organization differ in the extent to which they reduce targeted exports. We show that antidumping duties, on average, hit Chinese exporters harder than those of other targeted countries. This difference can be traced back in part to China's non-market economy status, which affects the way antidumping duties are calculated. Furthermore, we show that the type of imposed duty matters, as ad-valorem duties affect exports differently compared to specific duties or duties conditional on the export price. Overall, however, antidumping duties remain effective in reducing imports independent of market economy status.
This article introduces the Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB), a new dataset of economic sanctions that covers all bilateral, multilateral, and plurilateral sanctions in the world during the 1950–2016 period across three dimensions: type, political objective, and extent of success. The GSDB features by far the most cases amongst data bases that focus on effective sanctions (i.e., excluding threats) and is particularly useful for analysis of bilateral international transactional data (such as trade flows). We highlight five important stylized facts: (i) sanctions are increasingly used over time; (ii) European countries are the most frequent users and African countries the most frequent targets; (iii) sanctions are becoming more diverse, with the share of trade sanctions falling and that of financial or travel sanctions rising; (iv) the main objectives of sanctions are increasingly related to democracy or human rights; (v) the success rate of sanctions has gone up until 1995 and fallen since then. Using state-of-the-art gravity modeling, we highlight the usefulness of the GSDB in the realm of international trade. Trade sanctions have a negative but heterogeneous effect on trade, which is most pronounced for complete bilateral sanctions, followed by complete export sanctions.
Due to its economic size, economic policy measures, in particular trade policies, have a far‐reaching impact on global economic developments. This chapter quantifies the economic consequences of US protectionist trade aspirations. It focuses on trade policy scenarios, which have been communicated by the current US administration as potential new trade policies. The chapter draws on the results of a study of the ifo Institute conducted on behalf of the Bertelsmann Foundation. In the first simulation, a retraction from the North American Free Trade Agreement is considered. The chapter then illustrates the potential consequences of a “border tax adjustment” policy. It also simulates further measures to protect the US market by presuming an increase in American duties. The chapter presents robust quantitative results that can be expected if an increasingly protectionist US trade policy were to be implemented.
A growing share of modern trade policy instruments is shaped by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Based on a structural gravity equation and the recently updated Global Trade Alert database, we empirically investigate the effect of NTBs on imports. Our analysis reveals that the implementation of NTBs reduces imports of affected products by up to 12%. Their trade dampening effect is thus comparable to that of trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping duties. It is smaller for exporters that have a free trade agreement with the importing country. Different types of NTBs affect trade to a different extent. Finally, we investigate the effect of behind-the-border measures, showing that they significantly lower the importer’s market access.
When a country grants preferential tariffs to another, either reciprocally in a free trade agreement (FTA) or unilaterally, rules of origin (RoOs) are defined to determine whether a product is eligible for preferential treatment. RoOs exist to avoid that exports from third countries enter through the member with the lowest tariff (trade deflection). However, RoOs distort exporters' sourcing decisions and burden them with red tape. Using a global data set, we show that, for 86% of all bilateral product-level comparisons within FTAs, trade deflection is not profitable because external tariffs are rather similar and transportation costs are non-negligible; in the case of unilateral trade preferences extended by rich countries to poor ones that ratio is a striking 98%. The pervasive and unconditional use of RoOs is, therefore, hard to rationalize.
A growing share of modern trade policy instruments is shaped by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Based on a structural gravity equation and the recently updated Global Trade Alert database, we empirically investigate the effect of NTBs on imports. Our analysis reveals that the implementation of NTBs reduces imports of affected products by up to 12%. Their trade dampening effect is thus comparable to that of trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping duties. It is smaller for exporters that have a free trade agreement with the importing country. Different types of NTBs affect trade to a different extent. Finally, we investigate the effect of behind-the-border measures, showing that they significantly lower the importer’s market access.