This paper examines how varying antidumping methodologies applied within the World Trade Organization differ in the extent to which they reduce targeted exports. We show that antidumping duties, on average, hit Chinese exporters harder than those of other targeted countries. This difference can be traced back in part to China's non-market economy status, which affects the way antidumping duties are calculated. Furthermore, we show that the type of imposed duty matters, as ad-valorem duties affect exports differently compared to specific duties or duties conditional on the export price. Overall, however, antidumping duties remain effective in reducing imports independent of market economy status.
We quantify the effects of GATT/WTO membership on trade and welfare. Using an extensive database covering manufacturing trade for 186 countries over the period 1980–2016, we find that the average partial equilibrium impact of GATT/WTO membership on trade among member countries is large, positive, and significant. We contribute to the literature by estimating country-specific estimates and find them to vary widely across the countries in our sample with poorer members benefitting more. Using these estimates, we simulate the general equilibrium effects of GATT/WTO on welfare, which are sizable and heterogeneous across members. We show that countries not experiencing positive trade effects from joining GATT/WTO can still gain in terms of welfare, due to lower import prices and higher export demand.