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The Global Sanctions Data Base (GSDB): an update that includes the years of the Trump presidency
(2021)
A growing share of modern trade policy instruments is shaped by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Based on a structural gravity equation and the recently updated Global Trade Alert database, we empirically investigate the effect of NTBs on imports. Our analysis reveals that the implementation of NTBs reduces imports of affected products by up to 12%. Their trade dampening effect is thus comparable to that of trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping duties. It is smaller for exporters that have a free trade agreement with the importing country. Different types of NTBs affect trade to a different extent. Finally, we investigate the effect of behind-the-border measures, showing that they significantly lower the importer’s market access.
A growing share of modern trade policy instruments is shaped by non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Based on a structural gravity equation and the recently updated Global Trade Alert database, we empirically investigate the effect of NTBs on imports. Our analysis reveals that the implementation of NTBs reduces imports of affected products by up to 12%. Their trade dampening effect is thus comparable to that of trade defence instruments such as anti-dumping duties. It is smaller for exporters that have a free trade agreement with the importing country. Different types of NTBs affect trade to a different extent. Finally, we investigate the effect of behind-the-border measures, showing that they significantly lower the importer’s market access.
AbstractSanctions encompass a wide set of policy instruments restricting cross‐border economic activities. In this paper, we study how different types of sanctions affect the export behavior of firms to the targeted countries. We combine Danish register data, including information on firm‐destination‐specific exports, with information on sanctions imposed by Denmark from the Global Sanctions Database. Our data allow us to study firms' export behavior in 62 sanctioned countries, amounting to a total of 453 country‐years with sanctions over the period 2000–2015. Methodologically, we apply a two‐stage estimation strategy to properly account for multilateral resistance terms. We find that, on average, sanctions lead to a significant reduction in firms' destination‐specific exports and a significant increase in firms' probability to exit the destination. Next, we study heterogeneity in the effects of sanctions across (i) sanction types and sanction packages, (ii) the objectives of sanctions, and (iii) countries subject to sanctions. Results confirm that the effects of sanctions on firms' export behavior vary considerably across these three dimensions.
When a country grants preferential tariffs to another, either reciprocally in a free trade agreement (FTA) or unilaterally, rules of origin (RoOs) are defined to determine whether a product is eligible for preferential treatment. RoOs exist to avoid that exports from third countries enter through the member with the lowest tariff (trade deflection). However, RoOs distort exporters' sourcing decisions and burden them with red tape. Using a global data set, we show that, for 86% of all bilateral product-level comparisons within FTAs, trade deflection is not profitable because external tariffs are rather similar and transportation costs are non-negligible; in the case of unilateral trade preferences extended by rich countries to poor ones that ratio is a striking 98%. The pervasive and unconditional use of RoOs is, therefore, hard to rationalize.
We quantify the effects of GATT/WTO membership on trade and welfare. Using an extensive database covering manufacturing trade for 186 countries over the period 1980–2016, we find that the average partial equilibrium impact of GATT/WTO membership on trade among member countries is large, positive, and significant. We contribute to the literature by estimating country-specific estimates and find them to vary widely across the countries in our sample with poorer members benefitting more. Using these estimates, we simulate the general equilibrium effects of GATT/WTO on welfare, which are sizable and heterogeneous across members. We show that countries not experiencing positive trade effects from joining GATT/WTO can still gain in terms of welfare, due to lower import prices and higher export demand.